Riehl
v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wash.2d 138,
94 P.3d 930 (2004)
Riehl was fired by Foodmaker in
1999 and then refused rehire. He suffers from depression and posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). He sued Foodmaker based on lack of accommodation
during employment and disparate treatment during the firing and rehiring
process. The Supreme Court held that
his accommodation claim was properly dismissed but that a material disputed
issue of fact existed as to whether Foodmakers’ stated reasons for firing
and/or not rehiring Riehl are pretext for a discriminatory purpose.
The Court explained that an
employee may allege failure to accommodate where the employer failed to take
steps reasonably necessary to accommodate the employee’s condition. The
Court pointed to certain of its recent decisions in this area and stated it
has “established a clear rule that where an employee determines he or she
needs accommodation for a disability but fails to provide a medical nexus
between the disability and the need for accommodation, accommodation is not
medically necessary. If accommodation is not medically necessary, it is
unreasonable to require an employer to provide accommodation.” The Court
stated that this requirement is not burdensome for the employee and
appropriately limits the employer’s duty to accommodate by assuring that an
employer is not required to provide unnecessary accommodations.
In this case, the Court agreed
that summary judgment was appropriate. The employer had provided certain
accommodations, and “[t]here was no medical confirmation in the record that
Riehl’s abnormalities required further accommodation, such as feedback and a
performance evaluation, and the need to accommodate his disability was not
obvious and required greater documentation to survive summary judgment.”
On the disparate treatment claim, the Court explained that to survive summary judgment Riehl “need only show that a reasonable judge or jury could find Riehl’s disability was a substantial factor motivating [Foodmakers’] adverse actions.” Riehl established his prima facie case in that he was disabled, able to perform his job and was fired and not rehired. Foodmaker met its burden of producing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to rebut the presumption of discrimination. Specifically, it produced evidence that Riehl was fired because the company did not need two supervisors, the other supervisor had better job performance, and Riehl’s attitude and comments during the rehiring process made him ineligible for rehire. The burden then shifted to Riehl to produce evidence that shows Foodmakers’ stated reasons for the adverse action are a pretext for a discriminatory intent. The Court concluded that Riehl met this burden and there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Foodmakers’ actions and a reasonable trier of fact could find his disability was a substantial factor for the company’s adverse employment actions.
Anica v. Wal-Mart
Stores, 120
In 1998, Wal-Mart hired Anica to work in one of
its stores. In 1999, Anica was injured on the job.
Wal-Mart gave her a different job to accommodate the resulting job
restrictions. In May 2000, Anica was again injured at work.
In August 2000, when she was released to work, Wal-Mart again placed her
in a job she could perform given the physical limitations arising from the
injury.
Six days after Anica returned to work, Wal-Mart fired her because she had
failed, despite repeated requests over a five-month period, to provide Wal-Mart
with a valid social security number. Anica sued, alleging disability
discrimination. Wal-Mart prevailed on summary judgment, and Division One
affirmed, holding that Anica failed to establish a prima facie case for
disparate treatment disability discrimination.
Anica had relied on the temporal proximity between her return to work and
her termination as evidence of disparate treatment.
In rejecting that argument, Division One explained that
Anica’s
"timing argument" failed because the evidence showed that Wal-Mart did
not fire her after her first injury, she was asked to resolve the social
security issue before the second injury, she as not fired when she was injured
again, she was given a medical leave of absence and when she returned to work
she still had not resolved her Social Security problems. Only then was
she fired. In that regard, she was treated no worse and perhaps better
than any other employee who, despite repeated requests, could not
produce a valid social security number.
Peterson v. Smurfit-Stone Container
Corporation, 121
Randy
Peterson was hired in February 1997 to work for Smurfit-Stone at a plant that
had recently opened. About seven
months later, he was terminated. In
early 2000, Peterson sued in King County Superior Court alleging, among other
things, failure to accommodate and discrimination based on disability.
The trial court dismissed his claims on summary judgment, and Division
One affirmed. (A petition for review
is pending.)
The disability at issue involved
Peterson’s assertion that he has a “biological clock” problem which causes
him to suffer anxiety, insomnia, nausea, and other adverse emotional and
physical symptoms when he works an off shift (i.e., other than the day shift).
Peterson alleged he expressly advised
the plant managers that he would not accept a position with the company if it
meant having to work off shifts. He
further alleged being promised he would work only day shift.
One manager recalled Peterson stating during his interview that he did
not like second shift and had paid his dues by working that shift at other jobs.
In July 1997, the plant added a second
shift to handle increased production. In
late August, Peterson was assigned to that shift for an indefinite period.
After a few days, he called in sick. His
doctor then advised the plant that Peterson needed a 30 day leave due to
work-related anxiety. On October 6,
Peterson was terminated based on issues that arose during the leave.
In its holding, Division One explained
that to survive summary judgment on a disability claim, the employee must, as
part of his prima facie case of discrimination, provide medical evidence of a
disability. The court concluded that, while Peterson’s doctor diagnosed him as
having anxiety, hypertension and insomnia, she did not conclude he had a
medically cognizable or diagnosable condition of being unable to work second
shift. As such, there was no medical evidence to prove the particular diagnosis
he claimed. The conditions his
doctor diagnosed could have resulted from his unhappiness at being required to
work a shift he preferred not to work, from conflicts with his supervisor or
some other issue.
In dismissing the disability claims,
including regarding perception or record of disability, Division One noted that
Peterson had worked second shift at previous jobs, never had a medical diagnosis
relating to his alleged condition before working for Smurfit-Stone, made no
reference to this issue in his pre-employment medical examination, did not see a
doctor for his symptoms before September 1997 and, after being terminated,
applied for off shift work with a different employer.